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Abstract 
This article analyzes the depiction of political parties in a “hybrid regime” so as to 
explain how state-sponsored articulatory practices contribute to the discrediting of 
potential opponents. Through an examination of textbooks, speeches and government 
documents combined with semi-structured interviews and participant observation, it 
dissects how tropes concerning party weakness or extremism make Jordan appear 
unprepared for democracy. Making the legal opposition seem menacing or incompetent 
helps the Hashemite regime legitimize the haphazard pace of political reforms. It is a 
crucial strategy through which the monarchy maintains the backing or tepid compliance 
of foreign and local supporters. Yet still, the discursive features of authoritarianism, in 
Jordan and elsewhere, continue receiving short thrift.  Far from epiphenomenal, the 
monarchy’s discursive practices shape the conceptual universe and institutional contexts 
in which politics takes place.  
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Prior to the events now remembered as the Arab Spring, Jordan was frequently 
classified as a ‘hybrid regime.’1 The Hashemite Kingdom was deemed an ‘authoritarian 
monarchy,’ ‘liberal autocracy’ or ‘pseudo-democracy,’ never quite fitting neatly into the 
typologies so beloved in the democratization literature.
2
 Along with Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia, Jordan adopted various formal institutions commonly associated with liberal 
democracy, yet to little avail. Monarchical rule persisted, although its institutional façade 
was transformed. Today, the Hashemite Kingdom is frequently praised as a paragon of 
stability and prudent reform. Continuity in rule and minimal social unrest offer a soothing 
contrast to the chaos that engulfs its neighbors. Foreign allies praise the country’s king, 
international organizations commend the regime’s commitment to democratization, while 
many Jordanian politicians accept the limits placed on participation as prudent and 
necessary.
3
 The intermittent external pressures to democratize have faded; the 
fluctuations of geopolitics have downgraded the importance of political reform. As one 
prominent Washington commentator stated recently, ‘the survival of the Hashemite 
regime is a U.S. strategic imperative.’4 The perils of regional instability, rising extremism 
and an untrustworthy opposition make public participation appear an unwarranted risk.  
Interestingly, government officials and Palace spokespeople continue to 
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emphasize the Hashemite regime’s commitment to political reform to audiences at home 
and abroad. King Abdullah II is an expert in this regard. An authoritarian incumbent who 
quickly learned the vocabulary of international expectations, he has fully adopted the 
rhetoric of democratization.
5
 In addition to generating foreign support for the monarchy, 
this rhetoric has been a key weapon in the Palace’s domestic political arsenal; it functions 
as the never-ending soundtrack of Jordanian politics. Taken at face value, the monarchy 
appears not only interested but also committed to implementing free and fair elections, a 
multi-party system and representative parliamentary government. As Schwedler points 
out, ‘these concepts are often left poorly defined, though they are frequently invoked.’6 
Despite this conceptual ambiguity, key actors exert considerable and consistent effort to 
publicize the regime’s democratizing pretensions. Yet still, Jordanian politics is rarely 
pondered in relation to these non-institutional forms of power. The discursive features of 
authoritarianism receive short thrift.  
To remedy this lacuna, this article explores the monarchy’s portrayal of partisan 
life in Jordan to illustrate how it shapes one key political debate in the country. It draws 
upon Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse, defined as a horizon of ‘multifarious 
practices, meanings and conventions…through which a certain sense of reality and 
understanding of society are constituted,’7 to scrutinize the power relations and strategies 
through which the Hashemite regime attempts to fix meaning within a particular domain. 
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Specifically, it examines the articulation of a key nodal point (democracy) that 
provisionally binds together a particular web of meanings and privileged signifiers 
(political parties, reform and opposition) at the heart of the monarchy’s legitimating 
discourse.
8
 It does so through a heuristic analysis of the Palace’s depiction of partisan life 
and opposition politics so as to explore the persistent assumptions, themes and 
vocabularies that shape, enable and constrain the country’s political reform debate. I 
follow Andrea Teti’s call to approach democratization as a discourse and a category of 
action in its own right by focusing on the ‘processes through which what counts as 
knowledge is produced and deployed in policy-making and practice.’9   
In more than one hundred interviews (=117) conducted during 14 months of 
fieldwork in Jordan (2013-2014), party weakness or extremism was consistently 
emphasized during discussions of the political reform process. The majority of those 
queried referenced surveys indicating low party membership, highlighted the dogmatic 
beliefs of certain groups, or underscored the incapacity of organized political forces. 
Even organizations and citizens critical of the regime’s democratization efforts frequently 
echoed the monarchy’s rhetoric, citing party incapacity or radicalism as a chief obstacle 
to political reform. Why do political parties remain inconsequential despite the 
monarchy’s rhetorical commitment to strengthening them? How do different actors relate 
to the Palace’s portrayal of Jordan’s political groups and what political impact does this 
engender? Coupled with the abovementioned interviews, I explored these questions by 
observing seven different NGO-sponsored conferences and seminars in which various 
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elements of political reform and partisan life were discussed (party capacity building, 
electoral laws, decentralization). This allowed a more detailed understanding of Jordanian 
party politics from the perspective of its key participants. In addition, I compiled 
introductory university textbooks in history, civics and politics and official Palace 
documents (speeches, press releases, working papers) to re-construct the official position. 
This combination helped capture the regime’s portrayal of democratization, trace the 
mechanisms for its diffusion while analyzing its impact. The article will argue that 
narratives emphasizing party weakness or extremism work to make Jordan appear as 
simply not ready for parliamentary democracy. These tropes are more than just an 
ideology meant to foster false consciousness or acquiesce foreign donors; they comprise a 
set of ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.’10 Party 
weakness and extremism are, in many respects, a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The article proceeds in four parts. It begins by outlining the contours of 
hegemonic depictions of Jordanian political parties before assessing prevalent methods 
used to study these dynamics. I critique the democratization literature’s consistent 
disregard for non-institutional forms of power, a form of ‘statolatry’ that views the state 
as a fixed entity whose actions and effects are limited to formal institutions.
11
  The 
following section summarizes Jordanian political reforms and developments since 1989. 
The third section dissects regime-sponsored rhetoric regarding Jordan’s political parties. 
It outlines both their deployment by authoritarian elites as well as their adoption by key 
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local and foreign actors. The essay concludes by expanding on its main theoretical and 
empirical insights, teasing out the importance of discursive practices to autocratic rule.  
The Contingent Truths of Partisan Life  
‘One should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern world, 
political parties have in the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of the world, 
because essentially what they do is to work out the ethics and the politics 
corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their historical 
“laboratory”.’12  
 
Party frailty and extremism stand foremost among the pretexts deployed by the 
Jordanian monarchy to implicitly legitimize haphazard political reforms. For former 
Minister of Political Development, current Senator and one-time member of Jordan’s 
illegal opposition, Musa Maaytah, gradual change is the only way forward: ‘We have no 
tradition of democratic life in Jordan. We must build it slowly, with the King leading the 
reforms and ensuring stability.’13 For Maaytah, ‘the current parties are a mess, how can 
we democratize when we have such weak political organizations?’14 Unsurprisingly, 
current members of the royally appointed Cabinet feel similarly. When pressed on 
possible amendments to the King’s constitutional powers in early 2013, Prime Minister 
Abdullah Ensour stated that, ‘We are not currently ready to amend the King’s powers in 
the Constitution because the democratic process in Jordan has only just begun, and 
partisan life has not yet reached maturity.’15 By depicting the opposition as menacing, 
incompetent or unprepared, the regime compels foreign allies and international 
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organizations to fear potential instability in a country whose geopolitical importance need 
not be reiterated. Such portrayals compel members of the Jordanian bourgeoisie to 
ponder the economic turmoil and violence that has accompanied political unrest in 
neighboring Iraq, Egypt and Syria. They also prompt ordinary citizens to consider the 
monarchy as the guarantor, rather than a prime obstacle, to popular participation. Over 
time, the meanings the Palace has assigned to political parties have assumed ‘the fanatical 
granite compactness of “popular beliefs” which assume the same energy as “material 
forces”.’16 Their impact is tangible. According to one survey conducted by an 
independent Jordanian NGO in 2012, 98% of Jordanians are not affiliated with any 
political party, while only 30% have some knowledge of the parties that exist within the 
country.
17
 Only 34% believed parties would play an important role in the 2013 
parliamentary elections.  
In explaining the persistence of monarchical rule in Jordan, prevalent approaches 
emphasize the importance of institutional arrangements and strategies in structuring 
choices made by members of the opposition, businessmen and the military.
18
 Other recent 
works highlight the significance of external support and economic liberalization, along 
with the pathways through which they bolster Jordan’s ruling elite and the coalitions 
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supporting monarchical rule.
19
 Undoubtedly, powerful foreign patrons, geopolitical rents, 
biased electoral laws and a circumscribed legislative branch are vital to authoritarian 
persistence.
20
 However, they cannot by themselves explain how Jordan’s incumbents 
continually sidestep demands for political reform. When alternative factors crucial to 
political outcomes such as religious legitimacy, symbolic power or nationalism are 
incorporated into analyses, scholars tend to assume or operationalize these “variables” in 
ways that do not explain or theorize how exactly the monarchy deploys discursive forms 
of power to legitimate Hashemite rule.
21
 Why so? Until the last decade, attempts among 
many Middle East specialists to contribute to universal theories and disciplinary debates, 
‘sovereign structures of scientific knowledge’22—as Mitchell calls them—led to a far too 
narrow focus on the institutions of “liberal politics.” This resulted in a serious disregard 
for other modes of governance, participation and resistance, which have been given 
increasing emphasis since.
23
 Yet still, predominant approaches, especially those prevalent 
in Jordanian studies, continue to neglect the impact of non-institutional forms of power 
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on the political outcomes they are so keen to elucidate.
24
 Authoritarian rule is assumed to 
arise from the center of a sovereign state controlled by a regime that weaves an all 
pervasive web of social control, rather than from assorted attempts at administering 
conduct and molding politics through management, inducement, persuasion and 
education.
25
 As a result, little attention has been paid to how the monarchy’s hegemonic 
discourse, disseminated through textbooks, speeches, government documents and 
everyday practices, contributes to the preclusion of consequential political change. 
The Palace’s own statements make effective political parties appear intrinsic to 
democratization.
26
 It is political parties’ shortcomings and extremist views that make 
reform at the current conjuncture hazardous. But are political parties even that important? 
Western-oriented and teleological as it may be,
27
 the democratization literature ascribes 
to them various roles that are useful to keep in mind. In addition to recruiting and training 
leaders, organizing the legal opposition and integrating citizens into procedural 
mechanisms, parties play a key role in institutions and practices deemed crucial to 
various forms of democracy.
28
 Bartolini and Mair, for example, emphasize their 
importance for: (1) elections, (2) the organization of factions and interests, (3) 
parliamentary legislation, (4) formation and appraisal of the executive and (5) policy-
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making.
29
 Others less wedded to liberal iterations of representation argue that parties 
‘render meaningful the idea of collective rule,’ by helping cultivate a broader democratic 
ethos.
30
  Of course, parties do not always play these roles. Financial fragility, limited 
linkages with society, a lack of internal democratic procedures, incomplete 
parliamentarization and clientelism have repeatedly inhibited party development in the 
Middle East.
31
 These shortcomings have been traced to authoritarian power and its 
predilections: judiciously-designed electoral systems, powerful patronage linkages, 
coercive practices or some combination of the above.
32
 Much of this holds true for 
Jordan, where institutional and distributive mechanisms foster party weakness. What 
remains far less examined is how the Hashemite regime and the discursive practices it 
deploys shape the development of Jordan’s political parties. Although some may doubt 
the importance of strong political parties, or the non-institutional forms of power that 
help maintain them in a position of weakness, the history of Jordanian political reforms 
makes evident the regime’s fear of the former, as well as its astute use of the latter. 
The Transition to Nowhere: Jordan’s Democratic Experiment 
In response to a 1988 fiscal crisis and subsequent austerity measures required as 
part of an IMF structural adjustment program (SAP), Jordanians of various political 
stripes carried their grievances to the street. Rioting throughout various southern towns 
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began on April 17, 1989. The events effectively shattered three decades of martial law, 
during which most political actors were forced underground or prohibited from framing 
their programs and activities in terms of the electoral politics that had flourished in the 
1950s.
33
 Three months later, King Hussein announced that the regime would hold 
elections and implement democracy. As various scholars have argued in retrospect, the 
monarchy’s goal was not meaningful participation but stability and control, ‘defensive 
democratization,’34 through calculated and pre-emptive political liberalization.35 
Although the 1989 elections were held under the terms of martial law, which banned 
political parties and placed heavy restrictions on the press, the result was not what the 
regime expected. The polls returned a boisterous and combative parliamentary majority 
composed of Islamists and leftists to the re-born Lower House.
36
 The 11
th
 Parliament 
(1989-1993) presented the monarchy with sincere and serious opposition. Involvement in 
peace talks with Israel was criticized, as were IMF-backed austerity policies. Although its 
policy impact was minimal given constitutional constraints on the legislative branch, the 
11
th
 Parliament did question, deride and oppose a number of the monarchy’s favored 
policies.
37
 Its vociferousness was cited by various interviewees as one of the main 
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reasons for the Palace’s quick disenchantment with meaningful political reform.38 
Following the 1991 National Charter, which bartered social recognition of 
Hashemite legitimacy for a codified path of political liberalization, the Political Parties 
and Press and Publications Laws of 1992 were passed.
39
 Although flawed, many hoped 
their passage would lead to a full-fledged democratic transition. The 1993 elections were 
to be the first in which parties could campaign legally since their prohibition in 1957. Yet 
by the end of the 11
th
 Parliament, the regime realized that public participation in elections 
did not entail acquiescence. Political liberalization had not been to the monarchy’s liking: 
a last-minute change to the 1986 electoral law in August 1993 ensured that it would be.
40
 
The amendment replaced the previous multi-member multi-balloting system with the 
single non-transferable vote (SNTV). SNTV employs a simple plurality rule in 
multimember districts, a system that has been described as ‘strategically complex, both 
for voters and candidates.’41 It incentivizes Jordanian constituents to cast their sole vote 
on a member of their kin or the tribal elite by localizing elections. As a result, 
parliamentary candidates consistently avoid party affiliation, as they are deemed hurtful 
to their electoral prospects.
42
 This directly limits the prospects for national parties.
43
 A 
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second key characteristic of the new electoral system was the purposeful gerrymandering 
of districts. It favored rural areas and southern towns considered bastions of monarchical 
support, whom were given a ratio of seats-to-voters far higher than urban areas 
traditionally linked to opposition currents.
44
 The new electoral formula all but ensured the 
disproportionate representation of loyalist candidates and affluent tribal leaders invested 
in the status quo.
45
  
Voting patterns in 1993 confirmed the supremacy of geographic considerations 
and those tied to them: kin, tribe and region.
46
 Palace-designed institutional policies 
ensured that parliamentary life would re-enforce the logics unleashed at the polls. 
Stripped of its ability to contest public policies deemed crucial to the monarchy, the 
Lower House quickly became a crucial cog in the regime’s distribution of patronage to 
loyal legislators and constituencies. Given budget cuts, fiscal austerity and unequally 
distributed economic growth, candidates perceived to be capable of channeling funds 
from a diminishing pool of government resources were increasingly valued. 
Parliamentary elections became exercises in ‘competitive clientelism,’ where nominees 
vie for access to public resources and to act as intermediaries in patronage networks.
47
 
They were a classic example of the ‘tragic brilliance’ typical of many authoritarian 
regimes, where citizens’ choices are relatively free, ‘yet they are constrained by a series 
of strategic dilemmas that compel them to remain loyal to the regime.’48  
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 To this day, elections and the parliament they elect remain tightly controlled 
spectacles designed and closely controlled by the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), 
the throne’s crucial ally and guardian.49 Their functions differ decisively from those they 
pretend to model in more participatory contexts, working instead to co-opt potential 
opponents, reward loyal supporters and acquiesce the superficial demands of external 
donors. The electoral law has gone through various iterations since 1993 (2001, 2010, 
2012), but its logic remains the same; calculated revisions are meant to ‘please 
international monitors while perpetuating the gerrymandered status quo.’50 The number 
of MPs has been increased to 150; 42 electoral districts remain astutely designed and the 
most recent change went so far as to concede 27 seats to closed proportional national list, 
so that citizens now cast one vote for an individual candidate and one for a list.
51
 
Nevertheless, the 17
th
 Parliament (2013-  ), whose election various Jordanian officials 
treated as ‘the inauguration of a new democratic era,’52 looked very much like its 
predecessors. Rural governorates dominated by tribal elites and pro-monarchical 
independents continue to send a disproportionate number of MPs to the legislature, which 
acts as ‘little more than a safety-valve,’ willing and able to criticize certain policies, ‘but 
seldom capable of influencing them.’53 With little incentive to cohere, compete, or even 
exist, parties remain poorly organized and lacking in programmatic substance, their role 
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in popular mobilization and governance are negligible.
54
 The institutional factors 
contributing to this outcome have been laid out above and described better elsewhere. 
Equally important but far less examined is the Hashemite regime’s portrayal of political 
parties and its impact on partisan activity in the country. 
Producing Weak or Extreme Political Parties 
In a September 2013 op-ed in World Policy Journal, King Abdullah II 
emphasized both the regime’s goal, ‘effective parliamentary government, under the 
umbrella of our unifying constitutional monarchy,’ as well the ‘practical requirements’ 
hindering its development: a lack of ‘nation-wide parties, able to formulate 
programs…party-based parliamentary blocs able to carry through programs and be held 
accountable by voters.’ 55 Of course, party weakness was not linked to practical measures 
taken by the regime to hinder their development; the blame was placed obliquely but 
squarely on the shoulders of the citizenry: ‘new structures and mind-sets had to be 
planted deep within our political system,’ stated the King.56  To disseminate this message, 
textbooks used in introductory history, civics and politics courses in Jordanian 
universities reiterate the monarch’s perspective. In one broadly used example, democratic 
reforms are said to require ‘sincere affiliation to the homeland, total loyalty to the 
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Hashemite regime, respect for the constitution and the law.’57 Without such principles 
firmly in place, ‘democracy could turn into chaos and an antagonistic slogan that could 
harm the nation.’58 For those being introduced to the country’s history through sanctioned 
textbooks, ‘Jordan faces a number of internal and external political challenges that 
constitute elements that threaten its security and political stability.’59 These hazards ‘still 
overshadow’ the transition to democracy.60 Such texts depict political parties as 
potentially threatening given their lack of ‘complete loyalty to the Hashemite 
monarchy.’61 They are rendered suspect due to their questionable allegiance to the central 
values of state-sponsored nationalism, which include: deference to the political role and 
religious legitimacy of the monarchy, the indivisibility of Jordanian national identity (as 
defined by the regime) and social stability implicitly premised on the suppression of 
debate regarding sensitive economic and foreign policy issues.
62
 When critiques of the 
peace treaty with Israel or neoliberal measures are uttered, they are said to reflect merely 
the ‘opposition’s desire to criticize every move the country makes.’63 Democratization is 
deemed necessary but potential obstacles make a rapid transition appear perilous. Elites 
promise the eventual inclusion of elected party members in the Cabinet but the King 
maintains that, ‘the timeline for this will depend on our ability to develop effective 
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national parties based on platforms.’64 As one prominent MP remarked in an interview, 
‘We need real, loyal parties before we embark upon democratic reforms that could be 
dangerous.’65 External threats, transferred domestically through political parties, allow 
authoritarian incumbents to justify repressive censorship laws, restrictions on partisan 
activities and severe curbs on organized protest.
66
 
A favored bogeyman of the monarchy’s close allies is the Islamist opposition. 
While Jordan’s Islamist sector is large and influential, it is hardly at the vanguard of 
radicalism. Most Islamist organizations in the country do not advance a revolutionary 
Islamic state or even the overthrow of King Abdullah II. The vast majority promote a 
constitutional monarchy that recognizes the religious legitimacy of the King. But these 
details are unimportant to regime elites, who continuously demonize the Islamist 
opposition. Notwithstanding their consistent defense of the monarch’s right to reign, 
Islamist parties and their leaders are consistently described as ‘hawkish’67 or ‘extreme.’68 
In October 2014, former Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit stated that, ‘The ideology of the 
Islamic State is the same as the Muslim Brotherhood.’69 Of course, only a powerful 
monarchy can maintain Jordan’s religious tolerance and social stability the argument 
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goes; an Islamist victory would impose a dangerous form of theocratic tyranny.
70
  
The monarchy and its allies’ portrayal of partisan life is flexible. Depending on 
the audience, political parties are deemed inept, ineffective or dangerous. At a November 
2013 conference on political participation jointly organized by the Al Ra‘i Center for 
Research and Institut Francais, Amman Mayor Aqel Biltaji reminded the audience that 
‘the political party system has not yet materialized in Jordan; they have not developed a 
clear vision with a tangible roadmap of the goals they seek to achieve.’71 While 
participating in a workshop run by foreign NGOs in January 2014, one MP asserted in an 
interview that, ‘party leaders should take Introductory Economics before we even think 
about changing the electoral law.’72 When pushed on the undemocratic nature of his 
remarks, the MP mentioned the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief tenure in power in 
neighboring Egypt, ‘Look what happened under Morsi, the Islamists have no idea how to 
govern or run an economy.’73  Others, such as Dr. Rohil Gharaibeh, a former member of 
the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and prominent participant in the reformist ZamZam 
Initiative, stress long-standing links between foreign organizations and Jordanian parties 
to explain the latter’s weakness. 74  
In Jordan we suffer from a unique problem, an essential difference (al-fāriq al-
jawharī). All parties have a foreign reference. In Morocco, there are truly 
Moroccan parties. They may be similar to or draw on the ideology of foreign 
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organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood or PLO but in Jordan we are wholly 
dependent on them.   
 
For Gharaibeh, critical of the Hashemite regime on various fronts, this foreign influence 
leads to a lack of national policies amongst the country’s political organizations: 
‘Jordanian issues receive little attention in party platforms and speeches, while Palestine, 
occupation and Iraq always garner large protests and media attention.’75  
The perceived dependence of Jordanian political parties on foreign organizations, 
accusations of which date back to the spread of Pan-Arabist currents in the 1950s, allows 
the regime to repress or de-legitimize parties by highlighting their foreign ties or 
supposed disinterest in national issues. For example, during the 1996 bread riots in 
Karak, King Hussein accused Iraq and several pro-Iraqi leftist parties of fomenting social 
unrest in the city before ruthlessly repressing protestors.
76
 Rather than legitimate 
grievances related to increases in the cost of living or inequality, social unrest and public 
protest is frequently depicted as the product of irresponsible political organizations linked 
to dangerous outside forces. Ties to foreign parties and movements are disconnected from 
the political measures that have historically made them useful or necessary: martial law, a 
lack of incentives for nationally-based platforms and the regime’s own conservative 
nationalism. Instead, it is blamed upon the extremist beliefs or administrative incapacities 
of political organizations. As one textbook asserts, ‘most left-wing and regionally-linked 
parties work to inflate the size of doubts around national belonging…they want to take 
internal divisions to an extreme.’77 Many citizens disbelieve or actively resist these 
claims; various surveys confirm widespread disenchantment with the pace of political 
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reform.
78
 In private conversations and internal party meetings, ample opposition to 
Palace-sponsored portrayals of political parties was expressed. Yet the reiteration of the 
monarchy’s preferred tropes in the public sphere occasions demonstrations of external 
compliance, which re-enforce a web of meanings central to the regime’s hegemony.79  
How exactly one can oppose the monarchy’s preferred policies without succumbing to 
the regime’s definition of key nodal points or being accused of treason is a vexing 
question.  
In an interview with local daily al-Ghad in August 2014, King Abdullah II 
revived this age-old strategy. He ascribed frequent bouts of unrest in the southern city of 
Ma‘an to, ‘a small, limited group of outlaws who do not represent [the town’s 
inhabitants],’ just as military forces were called in to repress growing protests.80 For 
Mohammad Farghal, director general of the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan’s 
premier defense academy and a retired major general in the country’s armed forces, the 
solution to such social unrest lies not in democratization or broadening participation but 
in ‘economic development and a careful eye towards those external forces fueling social 
unrest by way of our underdeveloped political organizations.’81 For Interior Minister 
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Hussein al-Majali, who later resigned due to his mishandling of the unrest in Ma‘an,82 the 
rioters who attacked a host of government facilities ‘were outlaws and wanted 
individuals. These are not loyal Jordanian citizens but criminals who are often fuelled by 
foreign ideologies, funds and organizations.’83 Well-known for his hard-handed approach 
to public protests as well as his consistent threats to disrupt the IAF’s peaceful political 
rallies, al-Majali explains social unrest by blaming ‘outside forces, which use Jordanian 
organizations to further their objectives.’84 Again, this trope is present in one of the 
country’s civics textbooks: ‘The foreign links of most parties raises doubts about their 
integrity, goals and principles, as well as the extent of their belonging to the nation.’85 
The lack of institutionalized forums in which to express disagreement, register protest or 
impact policies that have exacerbated social inequality play no apparent role. Popular 
unrest is more easily ascribed to political parties, who through their extremism or 
weakness become the vector for external threats.  
Reproducing Hashemite Tropes: Jordan’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
Given the regime’s long history of controlled political life, neither the monarchy 
nor Farghal or al-Majali’s remarks should be all that surprising. What is far more 
interesting is how Dr. Gharaibeh, local activists and members of civil society adopt or 
reproduce regime-sponsored critiques of Jordanian parties that help legitimize the current 
‘façade democracy.’86 For the head of the University of Jordan’s Center of Strategic 
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Studies, Musa Shteiwi, ‘Political parties in Jordan are not fit for a democratic 
transition.’87 He describes them as ill prepared and with little commitment to public 
participation. Although critical of the government on various fronts, Professor Shteiwi 
condemns parties for, ‘having grand ideals but no real programs, I have no faith in any of 
them.’88 Similarly, numerous local activists and non-affiliated critics of the regime 
described political parties as inept or incapable.
89
A local journalist, who was highly 
critical of the Palace’s foreign policy similarly argued that, ‘Parties do not offer concrete 
solutions and programs, we are better served by the King and his advisors.’90 One 
prominent member of the tribal hirāk (movement) described his disinterest in party life 
by way of their ineffectiveness, ‘There is no point in joining them [political parties] since 
they get nothing done. Imagine what an executive branch composed of those amateurs 
would do to the country.’’91  
The impact of the monarchy’s rhetoric lies not just in the intentions of those who 
formulate it but in ‘the conditions of their manifest appearance,’ as well as the 
‘transformation which they have effected.’92 Stripped of alternative vocabularies or 
imaginaries through which to explain democratization’s delay, the onus must fall on the 
political parties the regime has always blamed. As one would expect, government elites 
highly dependent on the Palace’s support claim they have no choice, responding as they 
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are to the barrenness of parliamentary and political life.
93
 ‘Reform needs to be gradual,’ 
one former Minister and current Senator repeated, ‘we lack true democrats, the 
opposition is filled with opportunists who only want to seize power.’94 Yet crucially, such 
assertions are not limited to monarchy’s most strident allies and supporters. In more than 
100 interviews with civil society representatives, foreign and local NGOs, journalists, 
academics and various individuals (students, businessman, bakers) critical of the regime’s 
democratization efforts, the immaturity or zealotry of those striving to mobilize the local 
electorate was continually emphasized. Of course, there were important differences in 
their remarks, often about who was to blame for the current political state of affairs 
(United States, Israel, tribal conservatives, the GID and Armed Forces). Yet their 
statements regarding political parties, especially when conducted in on-the-record 
interviews or made in public forums, displayed unforeseen levels of agreement. 
For Dr. Amer Beni Amer, director of the non-profit Al Hayat Center for Civil 
Society Development, ‘parties are not doing a good job of representing the people.’95 
While cognizant of the various obstacles hindering party growth, especially the electoral 
law, Amer de-historicizes the reasons for their weakness when describing their current 
role: ‘At the moment they are nothing but decoration, people want them [political parties] 
to show they are serious, which they have yet to prove.’96 Similar assertions were made 
in the majority of interviews with other Jordanian NGOs concerned with constitutional 
and political issues. The electoral law was occasionally criticized, political reform was 
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frequently deemed necessary and partisan life described as essential to democratization. 
Yet political parties were consistently described as weak, incapable or extreme. Crucially, 
the monarchy was never described as a hindrance to democratization, but positioned 
instead ‘at the forefront of reform.’97 
 Similar accounts were advanced by a host of non-Jordanian NGOs. While the 
foreign donor community encompasses a diverse array of actors, most organizations 
prefer to sustain themselves by depoliticizing their interventions and programs. 
Unsurprisingly, they faithfully reproduce regime narratives regarding political parties. 
For example, in 2003, the International Crisis Group noted that Jordan’s parties are 
‘institutional and financially weak,’ they are not only poorly organized internally but 
‘lack defined agendas and suffer from a deficit in grassroots support.’ They are content 
with ‘vacuous slogans and unrealistic proposals,’ moreover, ‘shortcomings within the 
parties themselves are largely to blame for this weakness.’98 More recently, the US 
government-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI) argued in its 2010 election 
report that ‘parties center more on individual leaders and personalities than on political 
platforms or ideologies.’99 Even when such organizations mention the institutional factors 
hindering party development, they rarely connect such outcomes to the regime’s 
discursive practices, or the foreign assistance that helps make Jordan’s political status 
quo possible.
100
  
                                                 
97
 Ibid. 
98
 International Crisis Group, ‘The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and 
Regional Instability’, Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003, p. 1 and 19. 
99
 https://www.ndi.org/files/Jordan-International-Election-Report-2010-ENG.pdf 
100
 Since the onset of the Arab Spring, the United States Congress has reiterated on various 
occasions that Jordan’s $660 million annual aid package would remain steady due to the 
country’s strategic value. In January 2016, Congress passed ‘an unprecedented’ $1.275 billion in 
 25 
The most recent USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy (2013-2017) 
for Jordan exemplifies these twisted logics. After highlighting how ‘Jordan’s civil society 
is nascent,’ and its ‘political parties are also weak,’ the strategy document outlines a 
number of programs aimed at strengthening ‘political participation and accountability.’101 
These focus on assistance to civil society organizations, prioritizing improvements in 
service delivery, advocacy skills and organizational management. Despite their obsession 
with bolstering parties through “capacity building,” “legislative strengthening,” “youth 
engagement” and other ambiguous “slogans,” most politically-oriented NGOs neglect the 
larger issues and actors inhibiting party development and political reform. Aid or loans 
from the US or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that sustain the political status-quo 
are never mentioned, it is simply assumed that the regime ‘will maintain broad political 
will,’ to pursue the policies necessary for ‘political stability.’102 By reproducing the 
regime’s narrative, these organizations, as well as the monarchy’s foreign allies,103 erase 
popular grievances and politics from the democratization debate. Democracy becomes an 
abstract value to be achieved, rather than a contested political outcome; a moral category 
that concerns social attitudes and values rather than tangible political processes. This 
contributes to a very rigid and controlled engagement with questions of public 
participation. It sidelines alternative practices and interpretations of democracy while 
giving the impression of a nascent transition for consumption by their benefactors.  
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Political party members are neither blind to the regime’s discursive practices nor 
unaware of their impact on partisan activity. For Ablah Abu Obleh, MP for Amman and 
Secretary General of the Jordanian Democratic People’s Party (HASHD): ‘The electoral 
law makes our efforts to gain supporters in Jordanian society difficult, but this is not the 
whole story. People are afraid of joining political parties, memories of the martial law 
period still weigh heavily on society.’104 After outlining the various measures HASHD 
has taken to counter popular trepidations (educational workshops, a weekly magazine, 
participation in elections), Abu Obleh revisited the difficulties fostered by the discursive 
panorama: ‘The security apparatus controls the conversation, it establishes the outlines of 
political life. Parliament can change certain laws, but partisan activity will be largely 
unimportant until political parties are no longer described or thought of as threats to 
social stability.’105 At a conference organized by the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies 
in September 2014, Sheikh Hamza Mansour, then Secretary General of the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF),
106
 vociferously condemned the electoral law as ‘a sanctions law 
rather than a freedom law, a crucial obstacle to parliamentary government.’ Yet 
Mansour’s disdain, and that of various interviewed members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political arm in Jordan, extends far beyond this one piece of legislation. 
Reforming the media and the political parties law are also essential. There is 
currently no space for parties to organize or recruit potential members or spread 
their ideologies. The people have been told to fear or ignore us. The King’s vision 
of strong partisan life will be impossible until we are given the space to openly 
recruit and actively mobilize citizens, without us or them fearing repercussions.
107
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In private conversations, active members of Jordanian political parties consistently 
described the numerous hindrances to the development of their organizations. The 
electoral law was frequently given pride of place, but the reputation of political parties, 
their portrayal in the media, was never far behind in their list of concerns. Participants in 
partisan life lacked neither agency nor opinion, merely the institutional tools, symbolic 
resources and social capital through which to alter the discursive status quo. 
Through textbooks, speeches, and the repetition of certain tropes in widely 
accessible venues (radio, newspapers, television broadcasts), the monarchy has made its 
preferred vision of democracy, the opposition and political reform pervasive.
108
 Such 
narratives operate as forms of power and influence in their own right, shaping political 
debates and sustaining the discursive conditions through which the regime bolsters its 
hegemony.
109
 Of course, this public transcript does not tell the whole story. Despite their 
current predominance, the regime’s preferred narratives are not ubiquitous, nor believed 
by all. When asked about the impact of the electoral law, patronage practices and other 
structural factors on Jordanian politics, one student at the University of Jordan stated:  
If it were just about institutions and their manipulation, political life and 
opposition would look very different. We have been contesting the electoral law 
since 1993. The real problem is how the regime controls the conversation; this is 
why popular unrest rarely translates into a pro-democracy movement.
110
 
 
Like any political community, Jordan’s authoritarian incumbents offer justifications for 
the exercise of power so as to win popular consent for institutional arrangements and 
government policies. They dominate what remains a lopsided discussion, deploying a 
highly partial and self-serving set of narratives that are “designed to be impressive, to 
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affirm and naturalize the power of dominant elites, and to conceal or euphemize the dirty 
linen of their rule.”111 While this paper is limited to analyzing the dissemination and 
impact of the monarchy’s preferred narratives, I wish to emphasize that in Jordan, as in 
other locales, discursive forms of power are far from all-determining. Ordinary citizens 
are not merely ‘the playthings of elite discourse.’112 But appearances do matter, and even 
false deference is an important exhibition of the regime’s grip on politics. The capacity of 
dominant groups to prevail—although never completely—in constituting the public 
transcript is both a key instrument and measure of their power.
113
 
Jordan’s Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
Seen from afar, Jordan’s democratic transition appears to be underway. But a 
closer look takes much of the shine off of the regime’s reformist veneer. The Hashemite 
Kingdom retains certain formally democratic institutions and procedures, yet the 
underlying distribution of power remains far from democratic. Despite the selective 
implementation of reforms since 2011, the country’s Constitution, especially articles 24-
30, still retains explicitly autocratic features. The fundamental powers of government 
remain subject to the whims of one man; yet importantly, the majority of those who dare 
speak out are not ruthlessly crushed, but steadily suffocated. Key to this asphyxiation is 
the simultaneous deployment of the rhetoric of democratization alongside its subversion 
from within. The monarchy and its allies regularly espouse their desire to initiate and 
carry out a transition, yet continually emphasize various factors (regional instability, the 
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citizenry’s immaturity, political party extremism or incapacity) that hinder the process. 
The efficacy of the regime’s preferred categories can be glimpsed in the ways that their 
repetition helps bring into being the reality it presumably only describes, producing 
observable political effects.
114
 ‘Of course we are weak,’ PFLP General Secretary Abu 
Obleh argued, ‘if powerful people call someone crazy enough times, everyone will 
believe it, or at least pretend to.’115 Defeated institutionally and degraded rhetorically, 
political parties in the country look just as those in power describe them.  
Party weakness is, in many respects, a self-fulfilling prophecy, what sociologist 
Robert K. Merton defines as, ‘in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking 
a new behavior which makes the original false conception come “true”.’116 As Merton 
reminds us: ‘The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of 
error,’117 more than two decades after liberalization began, Jordanian parties remain 
poorly organized and meekly supported. The ‘real challenge facing the opposition today 
is voters’ reluctance to join political parties,’118 claims King Abdullah II, altering the 
behavior of the more than 90% of Jordanians who do not join organized parties is ‘a 
matter that requires serious efforts.’119 ‘For the prophet will cite the actual course of 
events as proof that he was right from the very beginning’: when parties boycott 
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elections, play little legislative role or perform poorly in the polls, the monarchy’s 
prophecy stands confirmed. 
120
  
Conclusion 
In an attempt to further the post-democratization research agenda, this article has 
examined the complex interrelation between knowledge production, discursive practices 
and political outcomes. By way of semi-structured interviews with political elites, 
participant observation at party meetings and NGO conferences and close analysis of 
textbooks, speeches and official Palace documents, it dissects an all too often overlooked 
aspect contributing to party weakness: how the Hashemite regime’s portrayal of Jordan’s 
political parties relates to their very existence. I argue that state-sponsored articulatory 
practices contribute to the discrediting of potential opponents, a contingent and contested 
process that undermines public participation, and is by no means unique to Jordan. Far 
too frequently, an over-reliance on institutional approaches focused on rents, access to 
power and constitutional design blur micro-dynamics crucial to authoritarianism.
121
 
Analysts commit what Antonio Gramsci regarded as the most pervasive error in politics: 
equating state power with the formal institutional apparatus.
122
 When academic inquiries 
restrict themselves to these institutional confines, scholars risk missing out on a range of 
subtle mechanisms and shifting techniques of governance through which authoritarian 
rule is crafted, resisted and reproduced.  
In Jordan, authoritarian incumbents have put considerable effort into defining and 
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circulating representations of the nation-state and Jordanian politics.
123
 They deploy their 
‘paradigm power’ over the discursive space so as to maintain their position by making 
certain concepts and histories meaningful and acceptable to the citizenry.
124
 When key 
voices position the monarchy as the source of democratic reforms and portray the 
organized opposition as incapable, dangerous or immature, a distinct field of politics is 
formed and delimited. As a result, Jordanians become less susceptible to alternative and 
oppositional discourses, which also become harder to formulate. Of course, no one actor 
can completely dominate a field of discursivity, and the Palace’s preferred narratives are 
intermittently subject to various forms of resistance.
125
 Nevertheless, the Hashemite 
regime can be said to have created a hegemonic formation by constructing ‘not a shared 
ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking 
about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination.’126 This is a subtle but 
crucial mechanism for the reproduction of authoritarian power. It not only ensures 
support and funds from foreign donors, but also generates a politics of partial 
dissimulation that works to induce complicity and enforce obedience amongst the 
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citizenry.
127
  It does so through repetition and calculated enforcement, draining citizens’ 
political energies and habituating them to formulaic and self-serving rhetoric that fosters 
their accommodation with authoritarian power’s hard realities. As Lisa Wedeen has 
argued in the case of the Assad cult in Syria, official rhetoric, images and narratives not 
only exemplify a given political order’s power, they also help produce it.128 This is why 
the monarchy and its allies fill, with symbolic display and rhetorical flourish, the 
considerable chasm between the recalcitrant authoritarian realities of contemporary 
Jordan and the promise of the regime’s self-proclaimed democratizing pretensions. 
For monarchical rule to persist without the constant use or threat of coercion, the 
Hashemite regime must depend on more than brute force and institutional manipulation. 
For its hegemonic practices to “work,” the Palace must diffuse particular views and 
concepts throughout society. By partially fixing conceptions of democracy, reform and 
political parties, the Hashemite monarchy legitimizes certain governance techniques and 
practices. This is but one small part of the larger project through which ruling elites 
articulate different identities and subjectivities into a common project of rule. Crucially, 
this dynamic process cannot be fully understood without recourse to an analysis of 
discursive practices that remains sensitive to the institutions and relations of force that 
structure the field of knowledge. While it remains true that the political economy 
excludes the poor from prosperity, it is through close attention to the Hashemite regime’s 
discursive practices that we can observe how they are eased out of representation.
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Authoritarian persistence in Jordan cannot be understood or explained in isolation of such 
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powerful techniques of rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
